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The Tobin Tax
In 1971, Nobel laureate James Tobin suggested that
there be a tax levied on foreign currency transactions. In
proposing this tax, Tobin was walking in the footsteps
of John Maynard Keynes, who had suggested a turnover
tax for stock market transactions after the stock market
crash of 1929. Keynes’ intention was to stem specula-
tive trading by giving investors an incentive to hold
their assets for the long run. Unlike a turnover tax in
the stock market, the Tobin tax can be implemented
only with a coordinated effort of many countries;
otherwise, currency transactions would simply move
offshore. It is thus of interest to the United States that
this summer the French prime minister and the German
chancellor put the Tobin tax on the European agenda.
At the time James Tobin suggested a tax on currency
transactions, the Bretton Woods system of pegged
exchange rates was in shatters. The former Bretton
Woods members moved to a regime of floating
exchange rates in which arbitrage establishes a close
link between cross-country interest rate differentials
and expected changes in exchange rates. Tobin sug-
gested that a transaction tax would weaken the arbi-
trage mechanism, allowing the former member coun-
tries to preserve a modicum of monetary autonomy.
Today, proponents of the Tobin tax have little in
common with Tobin’s proposal, save for the goal of
diminishing the trading volume in foreign exchange
markets. The transaction tax appeals to many econo-
mists and policymakers nowadays because it seems
to be a solution to the widely accepted problem of
excessive trading in financial markets, brought about
by so-called noise traders. Noise is defined as news
irrelevant to the intrinsic value of a financial asset.
Unlike informed traders, noise traders are unable to
distinguish information from noise and consequently
are willing to trade frequently.
Clearly, excessive trading in itself is a waste of
resources. From this perspective, levying a tax on
foreign exchange transactions would improve efficiency.
On the other hand, noise traders provide liquidity to
financial markets. Noise traders are always available
as trading partners because there is a continuous flow
of noise in the market place. From this viewpoint, noise
traders dampen exchange rate volatility.
In early studies of noise traders, finance scholars
assumed that noise traders’ erroneous beliefs are idio-
syncratic and consequently have no sustained impact on
the prices of financial assets. In recent years, motivated
by what seemed to be excessive stock market valuations
of the late 1990s, finance scholars have devised theo-
retical models that show that, if noise traders’ beliefs
are correlated, there might be sustained deviations of
prices of financial assets from their intrinsic values.
In these models, arbitrageurs, who attempt to bring
prices back to fundamentals, are uncertain about the
course and the duration of the mispricing and conse-
quently trade less aggressively.
Would the Tobin tax be able to prevent sustained
mispricing and excessive swings in valuation in the
foreign exchange market? On one hand, the Tobin tax
would reduce mispricing by curbing the activity of
noise traders. On the other hand, the Tobin tax would
make it more costly for arbitrageurs to correct mispric-
ing, should it occur. 
At best, the Tobin tax would prevent the world
economy from squandering scarce resources on exces-
sive trading. However, such a policy is hardly worth
the risk of increased exchange rate volatility, especially
because this seems to be what the proponents of the
Tobin tax are trying to prevent.
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